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CHOICE OF LAW
WHEN THE FORUM IS PRESENTED WITH A CONFLICT
By GLEN E. KELLER, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The early development of choice of law doctrines was slow,
since the common law courts refused to entertain cases arising out-
side England and, when they did begin to recognize these actions,
only English law applied. Slowly, however, the increase of inter-
national trade and travel gave rise to the necessity of legal redress
to cover private transactions occurring outside the jurisdiction of
the forum. Thus, with this background, "Private International Law"
became an important part of the common law legal fibre. There
were few settled concepts, except that recognition of the laws of
another nation was based upon comity,' in the absence of contrary
public policy or the "law of nature."
'2
The constitutional bond between the states of the United States
created many different problems from those that existed between
nations. The comity theory was entrenched, however, and the pro-
nouncements of Mr. Justice Story helped keep this theory alive.
3
Not until the early 1900's did the attention of Professor Beale and
Mr. Justice Holmes cause a change in the accepted theories of
Story.4 With the foundation of Story's arguments shaken, two new
theories were advanced: the local law theory and the vested rights
theory. The first to arise and be accepted was the vested rights
theory, announced by Mr. Justice Holmes:
The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act
complained of was subject to no law having force in the
forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which, like
other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced
wherever the person may be found.5
Less than twenty years later, Judge Learned Hand announced
the local law theory:
[N]o court can enforce any law but that of its own
sovereign, and, when a suitor comes to a jurisdiction for-
eign to the place of the tort, he can only invoke an obliga-
tion recognized by that sovereign. A foreign sovereign
under civilized law imposes an obligation of its own as
nearly homologous as possible to that arising in the place
where the tort occurs.6
These two theories, "vested rights" and "local law" have pro-
Third year student, University of Denver College of Low.
I One of the earliest decisions respecting this problem was The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66 (1825),
Chief Justice Marshall speaking for the Supreme Court.
2 Id. at 74.
3 Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws - One Hundred Years After, 48 Hars.
L. Rev. 15 (1934).
4 Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Th'ir Role, and Utility, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 361
(1945).
5 Slater v. Mexican Nat'l. R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904).
6 Guinness v. Miller, 291 Fed. 769, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). Perhaps the foremost proponent of this
theory has been Professor Cook, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1942) and Cook, An Unpublished Chapter of the Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,
37 III. L. Rev. 418 (1943).
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vided the bases for most of the modern conflict of laws decisions
in the United States. Until recently, the vested rights theory seemed
to be general in its application and, although it has not been free
from difficulties, it has been a consistent guide to most courts when
called upon to determine the rights of injured persons. Recent de-
velopments in several jurisdictions have shown a trend away from
the vested rights theory and toward an application of the local law
theory. Mr. Justice Roger J. Traynor of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia has explained the evolution, citing the rigidity of the vested
rights rules as the basic cause of the trend.7
7 Troynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Texas L. Rev. 657 (1959).
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II. THE WRONGFUL DEATH PROBLEM
The crash of a Northeast Airlines airplane near Nantucket,
Massachusetts on August 15, 1958, and the litigation which followed
has resulted in several significant discussions of conflict of laws
theory.8 A hypothetical situation based upon this crash may serve
to illustrate the application of the vested rights and local law
theories as well as show the problems involved in their application.
Assume an airplane, flying a transcontinental route, originating
in New York, landing in Chicago and Denver and crashing shortly
after the Denver takeoff. Assume further that Passenger A was
domiciled in New York where he boarded the plane; that Passenger
B boarded in Chicago where he was domiciled; and Passenger C, a
resident of Colorado, boarded in Denver. The airline is an Illinois
corporation with principal offices in Chicago. Finally assume that
the crash was directly attributable to the negligence of the crew,
which occurred in Colorado.
A. VESTED RIGHTS THEORY
This theory provides that regardless of the domicile of the
parties or the location of theforum, the law of the place where the
tort occurred will govern all substantive matters pertaining to the
recovery. Since Colorado is the place of the tort and the Colorado
statute provides that the maximum recovery for wrongful death
from a common carrier is $10,000, 9 and since damages have usually
been considered to be substantive in wrongful death cases, 10 the
recovery by the plaintiffs would be limited to $10,000.
The theorists supporting this theory have argued that legal
rights are created only by the operation of sovereign made law
upon acts occurring within the jurisdiction of the sovereign. The
final argument is that but one law can be applied to any one act.
The strongest feature of the vested rights theory, as expressed by
several writers, is the ease of application and relative certainty of
result from its use.'1 Analytically, however, several flaws of a seri-
ous nature appear in the practical usage of the theory.
One important inconsistency is that this theory runs afoul of
the premise that law is territorial and a foreign sovereign cannot
govern the actions of the forum court. The language of Mr. Justice
Holmes is strongly indicative of this understanding:
No one would doubt that the law of Minnesota was nec-
essary to call the obligation into existence .... The contin-
ued operation of that law keeps the debt alive .... When
such obligations are enforced by suit in another State it is
on the footing of recognition, not of creation .... 12
8 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962), dissenting opinion adopted and
amplified 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962); cert. denied 372 U.S. 912 (1963); Kilberg v. Northeast Air-
lines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961).
9 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-1-1 (1953). Damages for deoth.-(1) Whenever any person shall die from
any injury resulting from or occasioned by the negligence, . . . of any . . . employee, while running,
conducting or managing any . . . conveyance operated for the purpose of carrying either freight or
passengers for hire . . . the corporation, or individuals in whose employ any such . . . employee
shall be at the time such injury is committed . . . shall forfeit and pay for every person and
passenger so injured the sum of not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and not less than three thousand
dollars . . P. .
10 Northern Pac. R.R.v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 (1894); c.f. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y.
99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
11 Cheatham, supra note 4 at 379; Stumberg, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1963).
12 Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 217 (1930), dissent.
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Analysis such as this causes a breakdown in vested rights, since the
theory is the enforcement of a foreign created right and the appli-
cation is the enforcement extraterritorially of sovereign law.
Another very strong criticism of vested rights is that there is
no room for flexibility when the court seeks to do "substantial jus-
tice." The basis for this argument is that except in cases of penal
laws or strong opposing public policy, the forum court must either
accept or reject the remedy; there is no middle ground. Actually,
this criticism did not become important until Erie R.R. v. Tomp-
kins13 was decided. Under the Swift v. Tyson14 rule, which preceded
Erie, a suit brought in the Federal District Court would not have
been plagued by this rigidity. Rather, in a case where the decision
under the law of the place of the tort would have been unduly harsh
or unjust, the court would follow a rule designed to do substantial
justice between the parties.
Aside from these arguments,, the criticism which must be di-
rected to the vested rights theory is that it forces a forum to ignore
its interest in the suit for the sake of uniformity. No allowance is
made for a situation in which the forum is the only state with any
interest in the suit other than the state where the tort occurred.
Applying this theory to the hypothetical example set forth
above, it would appear that if the personal representative of Pas-
senger A (domiciled in New York) sued the airline in New York,
where there is a strong constitutional mandate against a limitation
on wrongful death damages," the plaintiff would still be limited
to $10,000 maximum damages regardless of the actual loss involved.
As long as there are states which prefer to limit the recoverable
damages in wrongful death cases, this type of difficult situation will
continue to arise. New York has every conceivable interest in the
total transaction, except that the accident and the domicile of the
corporation are elsewhere. The fact that the accident occurred in
Colorado may well be considered fortuitous since it could have hap-
pened in a state where there was no limitation on damages. Vested
rights theorists, however, ignore this incongruity and argue that the
end, uniformity of result, justifies the means, harshness.
B. LOCAL LAW THEORY
The reason for development of the local law theory of conflicts
was opposition to preceding theories.16 The fundamental policy of
this theory is that since law is not extraterritorial in effect, the
forum can only apply its own law. Therefore, if the forum recog-
nizes the legal injury which has occurred to the plaintiff, it will
provide a reocvery, under its own law, which would be similar to
that allowed where the injury occurred. Transferring this to wrong-
ful death cases, a forum could elect to apply its own limitation on
the damages, or apply no limitation where the place of the injury
had a limitation. In the hypothetical example, the New York resi-
dent might sue in New York and obtain a recovery for all of the
damages which he could prove.
This theory is said to overcome the major defects of the vested
13 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
14 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
15 N.Y. Const. art. I, § 16.
16 Cheatham, supra note 4 at 385.
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rights theory. First, it allows the forum to enforce the law with
which it is familiar. Second, this theory is very flexible, in that it
permits the forum to use as a guide only that much of the foreign
law as it sees fit. There is, however, one important limitation which
must be noted. This is that the forum must have sufficient contacts
with the transaction in order to apply its own law. The Pearson
case 17 has indicated that without these contacts, a decision not fol-
lowing the law of the place where the injury occurred would be in
violation of due process and unconstitutional. The number and qual-
ity of these contacts is an important problem for the courts to
determine at the outset of every case. The Pearson and Kilberg
cases had domicile by the plaintiff, "doing business" by the defend-
ant, a course of business advertising and solicitation by the defend-
ant, purchase of the ticket and boarding of the plane by the plain-
tiff. Which of these might be considered essential to allow use of
the local law is not spelled out in the decisions and, therefore, must
be determined by analysis and subsequent decisions.
The local law theory is, however, not necessarily a complete
answer to the problems involved in this area of conflict of laws.
Cheatham argues that it would be extremely unfortunate if the
freedom allowed by the local law theory were to be widely used.18
It is his argument that only in complex situations should there be
a deviation from the foreign law as a guide to the decision. This
follows the theoretical outline presented earlier. The problem arises
where the parties and counsel attempt to determine when the court
will use the law of the forum and what part it may use. In face of
this difficulty, one must wonder if perhaps more problems might
be created by using the foreign law as a guide rather than applying
the foreign law in toto. Certainly the many varied interpretations
of the effect of contributory negligence in wrongful death cases
would lead to confusion by attorneys and judges alike. In effect,
Cheatham says that we should fall back upon the basic concepts of
vested rights except in "hard cases" when we may find an "out" in
the application of the local law theory.
The number of jurisdictions which might find sufficient con-
tacts with an occurrence, to bring the local law theory into play, is
readily apparent. In the hypothetical example, three states would
17 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 307 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1962), dissenting opinion adopted and
amplified 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
18 Cheatham, supra note 4 at 386.
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have these contacts and, of course, additional possibilities are un-
limited. This in effect means that totally different results would be
possible for each passenger in the plane. In turn, this will cause the
plaintiff's counsel to begin an analysis of the possible jurisdictions
and the occurrence to determine (1) those possible forums which
might find sufficient contacts with the occurrence and (2) from
among those which would have the most liberal recovery. This
raises the question of forum shopping, discussed by Goodrich as
follows:
The outcome of litigation ... should not be changed by
the fact that for one reason or another legal action is in-
stituted somewhere else than at the place where the opera-
tive facts were located. Fairness to the parties requires that
the fortuitous choice of a geographical place of suit should,
as far as is possible, not vary the way in which the suit will
be decided.19
As vested rights prevented any forum shopping, local law theory
appears to encourage it.20
Probably the greatest difficulty with the local law theory is the
burden which it places upon the parties to the suit. They must act-
ually prepare for two lawsuits upon one set of facts. This is because
there is no way to tell in advance what portion of the foreign law
will be used to guide the court and what part of the actual local
law may be used. In other words, where the vested right theory
may have been too rigid and certain, the local law theory may be
flexible and uncertain.
III. INTRAFAMILY TORT LIABILITY
Development and change in the field of wrongful death has
been fairly limited to date. In the area of intrafamily tort liability,
a substantial and fairly widespread development is appearing. The
cases usually have arisen where an accident, due to the husband's
or father's negligence, injures one or more members of a family in
a jurisdiction away from the domicile of the family. Subsequent
suit is brought in the family domicile. Where one of the jurisdic-
tions allows intrafamily suits and the other does not, important
questions are raised as to the propriety of the suit.
Courts applying the traditional vested rights theory in cases
where the foreign law did not permit an intrafamily suit, have held
that no suit could be allowed, even in face of the hardships which
appeared to be created and even though the forum would have per-
mitted the action had the injury occurred within its jurisdiction.
21
Where the forum (and domicile) does not permit suits of this type
and the law of the place of the wrong allows the action, the vested
rights effect has been avoided on grounds of public policy, or by a
procedural characterization of the right to bring suit.
22
The same theoretical faults with this method apply as they did
in the wrongful death situation. In addition, the hardships imposed
19 Goodrich, CONFLICT OF LAWS 7 (3d ed. 1949).
20 One very recent case has indicated that the courts will be alert to attempts at forum shopping.
Thompson v. Capital Airlines, 220 F.Supp. 140 (1963).
21 Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 AtI. 508 (1934); Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W.
342 (1931).
22 Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
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by the application of vested rights in intrafamily suits can be easily
seen.
The recent trend in cases of intrafamily suits has been to look
to the law of the domicile as that which will govern the action.23
The reason stated by the New Hampshire Supreme Court states the
basis for these decisions: "We consider that the incidents of the
status of marriage of parties domiciled here should not be deter-
mined by the law of another jurisdiction merely because they
chance to be involved in an accident there. '2 4
It is important to note that the courts here are not following
the strict local law theory.25 Rather, they are seeking justification
for using the local law to allow a recovery. In fact, the New Hamp-
shire court specifically stated that the foreign law as to the standard
of care would be applied. Thus, this has become but an exception
to the rigidity of the vested rights theory where the court feels it
cannot do substantial justice as between the parties. The courts,
however, have not faced the problem which confronts them, that
is what law may they apply and why.
IV. A PROPOSAL
Professor Brainerd Currie of the University of Chicago has pro-
posed a different approach which courts might take when presented
with a conflict of laws situation.26 This proposal approaches a solu-
tion to many of the problems presented by the local law theory and
the vested rights theory. Currie sets forth five suggestions which
should be helpful here in analyzing the problems presented:
1. Normally, even in cases involving foreign factors,
a court should as a matter of course look to the law of the
forum as the source of the rule of decision.
2. When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state,
rather than the law of the forum, should furnish the rule
of decision, the court should first of all determine the gov-
ernmental policy-perhaps it is helpful to say the social,
economic, or administrative policy-which is expressed by
the law of the forum. The court should then inquire wheth-
er the relationship of the forum state to the case at bar-
that is, to the parties, to the transaction, to the subject mat-
ter, to the litigation-is such as to bring the case within the
scope of the state's governmental concern, and to provide
a legitimate basis for the assertion that the state has an
interest in the application of its policy in this instance.
3. If necessary, the court should similarly determine
the policy expressed in the proffered foreign law, and
whether the foreign state has a legitimate interest in the
application of that policy to the case at bar.
4. If the court finds that the forum state has no interest
in the application of its law and policy, but that the foreign
state has such an interest, it should apply the foreign law.
23 Thompson v. Thompson, 193 A.2d 439 (N.H. 1963); Houmschild v. Continental Cos. Co., 7 Wis. 2d
130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955). See Ehrenzweig,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 581-583 (1962).
24 Thompson v. Thompson, 193 A.2d 439, 441 (N.H. 1963).
25 Cook, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942).
26 Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Low: Governmental Interests and the Judicial
Function, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 9 (1958).
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5. If the court finds that the forum state has an inter-
est in the application of its law and policy, it should apply
the law of the forum even though the foreign state also has
such an interest, and, a fortiori, it should apply the law of
the forum if the foreign state has no such interest.
2 7
The first suggestion seems to apply the strongest argument of
the local law theorists; no court can enforce any law other than that
of its sovereign creator. This argument follows logically from the
consideration of the American tradition; the power of a court to ad-
judicate is derived from the people, and surely the people would
prefer to be governed by the law which they, through their repre-
sentatives, have created.
The second suggestion provides the guide which courts inevit-
ably must find. Professor Currie suggests that the only legitimate
reason for applying the forum law to any suit is the interest which
the forum has in the case. This surely is the underlying, though
unexpressed, reason for the Kilberg and Pearson decisions in the
field of wrongful death, and of the many decisions now appearing
in the area of intrafamily suits. It has long been settled that the
state in which property is located is the only state which can affect
that property in any direct fashion. 8 This, too, is based upon a con-
cept of governmental interest and territorial sovereignty. Is not the
situs of property necessarily akin to the domicile of persons? An-
other important area where the courts have looked to the forum's
interest in the suit and the parties is the child custody situation.
The problem arises where the domicile of the parents is not the
same and the court is called upon to determine the proper custody
for the child. Many, if not most, courts have held that the domicile
of the child should provide the law to govern custody because, it is
said, that jurisdiction is the one with a direct interest in the welfare
of the child.
29
Governmental interest could take several forms in wrongful
death and other tort cases. The forum might be the domicile of one
of the parties to the suit, either plaintiff or defendant. It would be
indeed tenuous to argue that a state did not have an interest in one
of its citizens, be he a natural person or corporation. Further, the
state might be the place of the tort. No reason is readily apparent
why a state is not interested in injuries which occur within its bord-
ers, aside from questions of Due Process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The true basis for applying any law to any injury is
the interest which the forum has in the suit before it.
This method of choice of law does present several jurisdictions
in which there can be a governmental interest in the transaction.
Some may even argue that this runs afoul of the "forum shopping"
argument which is made to the local law theory. A certain amount
of truth is apparent in the argument, but the number of forums
available is, in fact, substantially limited and the objection would
seem to be minor.
Professor Currie's suggestions three and four provide the only
breakdown in the theoretical perfection sought in this area of con-
flict of laws. Primarily, the question is whether the forum should
27 Id. at 9-10.
28 Durfee v. Duke, 84 S.Ct. 242 (1963), which involves an unusual set of facts.
29 McMillin v. McMillin, 114 Colo. 247, 158 P.2d 444 (1945). Annot. 160 A.L.R. 400 (1946).
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apply the law of a foreign state, which, as pointed out above, the
court rightfully should not do. Rather, sound theory and practice
dictate that the forum court should call upon the forum non con-
veniens concept to relieve the courts from hearing controversies in
which the state can find no proper governmental interest. Should
not the forum court dismiss the action if it cannot find a legitimate
interest in the suit? Perhaps the question would be better stated by
asking if it would be proper for one jurisdiction to enter a judgment
in a case where the court had not been able to apply law with which
it was familiar, and at the same time force the state whose law was
applied to recognize the judgment under the Full Faith and Credit
clause of the Constitution. By the application of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, where the forum court has no governmental
interest in the transaction, the parties, the subject matter, or the
litigation itself, the court is merely guaranteeing that injustice will
not occur.
Professor Currie's fifth suggestion provides the solution to
many of the problems which have faced the courts for years. The
simple statement that the court should apply its own law if it finds
an interest in the suit, even if a foreign court also may have an
interest, seems so obvious that one wonders why the courts have
failed to give official sanction to the idea in wrongful death and
intrafamily suits. The proposal does not seem to be fraught with
problems of justification, as are the vested rights theory and the
"sufficiency of contacts" local law theory. As Professor Currie
points out, the Supreme Court has on eighteen separate occasions
either specifically supported the governmental interest theory or
determined cases consistent with it.
30
The use of governmental interest- in analyzing the hypothetical
example above shows the effective limitations on forum choice.
Both Colorado and Illinois have an interest in the possible suits, as
Colorado is the place of the injury and Illinois is the domicile of the
airline. The only interest which New York would have is as the
domicile of Passenger A. Therefore, Passenger A's personal repre-
sentative could sue in New York using the New York wrongful
death laws. If Passenger C's representative wished to evade the
Colorado limitation on damages by suing in New York, the New
York court would dismiss the suit under forum non conveniens,
because the forum had no governmental interest in the suit.
The suggestion has been made that this thesis will be met by
controversy. 31 Indeed it may, as are most suggestions for change.
The advantages of pursuing the governmental interest, however,
seem to overshadow other theories which have been advanced. The
proposal allows a forseeable rule of decision while avoiding a rigid
and inflexible application. Forum shopping is pared to a distinct
minimum, but convenience of the patries is served. The major ad-
vantage of the governmental interest idea is the simple, practical
basis which it provides for choice of law. The suggestion must be
made that appellate courts re-examine their purposes in conflict of
laws cases, and follow the dictates of their jurisdiction's interest
in the suit.
30 Currie, supra note 26 at 75.
31 Id. at 77.
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